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La questione delle strategie con cui parlanti e scriventi si pongono di fronte agli eventi comunicativi cui 
prendono parte, suscita l'attenzione dei linguisti da oltre un decennio. In quest'ottica, Biber et al. 
(1999) impiegano il termine 'stance' per designare l'espressione di giudizi e valutazioni, indagandone 
l'uso a cavallo di diversi registri (conversazione, prosa accademica e giornalistica). Inoltre, Conrad & 
Biber (2000) si soffermano sui diversi modi in cui parlanti e scriventi utilizzano gli avverbiali per 
contraddistinguere i diversi tipi di 'stance': tra questi, la 'stance' epistemica, intesa come formulazione 
della posizione di chi parla/scrive rispetto a certezza, veridicità o limitazioni di una proposizione, è 
stata analizzata con particolare riferimento al discorso accademico (Hyland 1998 e 2005a). In questo 
contesto, la 'stance' epistemica è stata frequentemente correlata all'uso di strumenti quali 'hedges' e 
'boosters', rispettivamente impiegati per esprimere con maggiore o minore assertività le proposizioni 
del parlante/scrivente. Questo saggio attinge a queste ricerche e ha come obiettivo di intraprendere 
uno studio comparativo di 'hedges' e 'boosters' in un'altra area del discorso specialistico, il discorso 
legale esemplificato dal genere delle sentenze. Lo studio è basato su due corpora comparabili e 
sincronici: il primo include sentenze emesse dalla Corte Suprema della Repubblica d'Irlanda, mentre il 
secondo comprende testi analoghi della Corte di Giustizia dell'Unione Europea. In quanto tale, la 
ricerca muove a partire da dati provenienti da due sistemi giuridici che differiscono quanto all'uso della 
lingua inglese (lingua ufficiale v. lingua franca). Il saggio presenta così i risultati di un'analisi qualitativa 
e quantitativa di 'hedges' e 'boosters' rilevati attraverso gli strumenti della linguistica dei corpora (Ädel 
& Reppen 2008; Scott 2009). I risultati mettono in luce i contesti in cui i giudici irlandesi e comunitari 
tendono ad intensificare il proprio discorso in modo caratteristico: ad esempio, si è potuto osservare 
che i giudici irlandesi impiegano l'avverbio clearly con l'intento di enfatizzare l'interpretazione delle 
norme da essi prediletta. E' così interessante notare che i dati stabiliscono un collegamento tra l'uso 
degli elementi presi in esame in contesto, da un lato, e le diverse ed eterogenee culture giuridiche in 
cui l'intensificazione è utilizzata, dall'altro.  
Parole chiave:  
stance, hedges, boosters, corpus, discorso, genere, sentenze, argomentazione. 
1. Introduction
The question of how speakers or writers qualify their contribution to the 
communicative events they take part in has preoccupied applied linguists for 
over a decade now. In this respect, studies such as Biber et al. (1999) and 
Hyland (2005a) have focused on the notion of stance as an attitudinal 
dimension encompassing features that refer to ways writers convey their 
judgments or opinions about and commitments to the truth value of what they 
are writing about. Stance thus denotes the ways writers stamp their personal 
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authority onto their arguments or step back and disguise their involvement, 
and it is expressed to varying degrees through attitude markers and self-
mentions, to name but a few widespread tools (McGrath & Kuteeva 2012).  
A number of works of relevance to the present research have analysed the 
discourse items through which stance may be codified. Accordingly, Conrad & 
Biber (2000) and Mazzi (2008a) deal with adverbials of stance as those 
elements commenting on the content or style of a clause or a specific part of a 
clause, whereas Hyland (1998, 2005b) examines hedges and boosters in the 
process of academic knowledge negotiation. On the one hand, he observes 
that hedges contribute to the weakening of claims through an explicit 
qualification of the writer's commitment. Overall, therefore, they show doubt 
and suggest that information is presented less as an accredited fact than as an 
opinion; as forms of mitigation of the writer's illocutionary force (Thaler 2012), 
hedges may therefore be employed to convey deference and respect for 
colleagues' views. On the other hand, boosters enable writers to assert a 
proposition with confidence, thereby making strong claims about a state of 
affairs. On the affective plane, they can "mark involvement and solidarity with 
an audience, stressing shared information, group membership, and direct 
engagement with readers" (Hyland 1998: 350).  
In addition, stance has been investigated in a wide range of discourse areas 
and genres. For instance, Hu & Cao (2011) undertake a comparative study of 
hedging and boosting in applied linguistics abstracts across English and 
Chinese journals, whilst McGrath & Kuteeva (2012) delve into practices of 
stance and engagement in pure mathematics research articles. Moreover, 
Fetzter (2006) discusses the pragmatic role of hedging as a communicative 
strategy of evasiveness in the context of political interviews, and at the same 
time she correlates references to the media frame by interviewers with the 
function of boosting a request for a piece of information. Finally, Vass's (2004) 
insightful article addresses the main socio-cognitive aspects of the use of 
hedges in two legal written discourse genres, i.e. US Supreme Court opinions 
and American law review articles. Since Vass's analysis of the relationship 
between hedging and a number of prototypical features of the selected genres, 
i.e. context and communicative purpose, is limited to a fairly restricted corpus 
size (5 judicial opinions and as many articles), research on forms of attitudinal 
qualification could usefully be extended to larger homogeneous data sets. 
In light of the above, the aim of this paper is to undertake a corpus-based 
comparative study of hedges and boosters as frequent tools used to express 
the speaker/writer's tentative or strong commitment to their own propositions 
within judicial settings. The focus therefore remains on legal discourse, but 
with regard to a single genre: more specifically, hedges and boosters will be 
observed in the judgments delivered by two courts – the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter, 'the ECJ') and the Supreme Court of the 
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Republic of Ireland (henceforward, 'the SCI') – in the field of agriculture, a 
highly controversial area which has been the matter of heated debate between 
European institutions and Member States for a few decades. In Section 2, the 
materials on which the research is based are discussed and analytical criteria 
are clarified, whereas Section 3 is dedicated to a presentation of the findings 
which are discussed in Section 4. 
2. Materials and methods 
The study is based on two synchronic comparable corpora: the first one, the 
ECJ corpus, includes the English version of 50 judgments issued by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (279,604 words altogether); the second, the 
SCI corpus, features 46 judgments delivered by the Supreme Court of Ireland 
(352,753 words).  
Judgments are a prominent genre of legal discourse, and they have attracted 
scholarly attention from a variety of perspectives. From a legal-theoretical 
point of view, judgments have been studied as the site where the judges' 
adjudicating power takes concrete form. Emphasis has therefore been laid on 
the role of justification in judicial decision-making (Alexy 1989), and a large 
number of now-classic works have focused on the methods through which 
judges weigh and balance the sources of law they rely upon, e.g. statutes, 
travaux préparatoires and prior court decisions (Goodrich 1987; Peczenik 
1989). From a discursive point of view, there has been a spate of interest in 
the relationship between the structure of judicial texts (Mazzi 2007a) and their 
distinctive rhetorical properties (cf. Pontrandolfo 2013 on phraseology). 
Typically, judgments begin with the identification of the court the case was 
tried in and the parties involved; they proceed with a review of the facts of the 
case, and they then invariably take a markedly dialogic shape where the 
arguments of the parties are interwoven to the judges' own line of argument 
(Cornu 2000; Mazzi 2008b) before the verdict is reached.  
In the analysis of judicial discourse, a comparative perspective has often been 
adopted, either across languages or across legal systems (Pontrandolfo & 
Goźdź-Roszkowski 2014). As far as the present study is concerned, the two 
sources were chosen for two reasons. First of all, they reflect the use of 
English across native and non-native contexts; secondly, the choice is 
indicative of the fact that the creation of such supra-national bodies as the 
European Union has brought not only speakers but also different and at times 
heterogeneous legal systems closer together (Maley 1994; Barceló 1997). EU 
Membership has had a strong impact on common-law countries like the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland: from a legal point of view, these have 
yielded to Community law, i.e. a legal system largely influenced by the civil-law 
tradition, and they have had to create a new legal infrastructure to 
accommodate the influx of vast amounts of EC/EU legislation in economic and 
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social matters (Byrne & McCutcheon 1996; Dimitrakopoulos 2001; Tomkin 
2004). From a more inherently linguistic perspective, these native English-
speaking countries have had to come to terms with a different legal and 
judicial system, in which the use of language might not necessarily overlap 
with the standards and conventions they have traditionally adopted in domestic 
legislation. From a lexico-semantic viewpoint, for instance, there may always 
be room for slight discrepancies in the use of a wide range of lexical items 
(characteristically, technical terms and modal verbs), each of which has a 
pivotal role to play in the production and the interpretation of judicial texts (cf. 
Wagner 2002 on problems related to the use of the controversial spatio-
temporal terms 'night' and 'dwelling house').   
The criteria of corpus design were essentially fourfold. First of all, the 
homogeneity of the judicial subject-matter covered by the judgments was an 
important parameter: for both corpora, only judgments concerning agriculture 
were selected.1 Secondly, the homogeneity of the sources was secured, 
because the judgments were issued by two courts of last resort in the 
respective jurisdictions, i.e. EU law and the legal system of the Republic of 
Ireland. Thirdly, the two sources were chosen with a view to their capability of 
representing English in use in both a native English-speaking national context 
– i.e. Ireland – and a supra-national context such as the EU, where English is 
not necessarily the language of the parties involved.2 
                                                 
1 ECJ judgments were downloaded from the official website of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, i.e. <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf? language=en&jur=C&td=ALL>. 
The URL directs users to a very detailed webpage, where one can set a wide range of search 
parameters – e.g. Period or Date, Authentic language, Subject-matter and Case status: in our 
case, last 5 years was set as Period or Date, English under Authentic language and Cases 
closed under Case status, whereas not only Agriculture but also other related terms suggested 
by the webpage itself were inserted as Subject-matter, e.g. Agricultural structures, Animal 
feedingstuff, Beef and veal, Cereals, Coffee, Eggs and poultrymeat etc. As regards SCI 
judgments, they were also downloaded from the Court's official website, namely <http://www. 
supremecourt.ie/Judgments.nsf/SCSearch?OpenForm&l=en>: the advanced search function 
allows one to insert any string in the quest for judgments, in addition to any judge's name one or 
more cases may be retrieved with. For the purpose of this study, the item Agriculture was used 
as the only search term in that it enabled us to come up with almost as many judgments as 
those already inserted in the ECJ corpus.  
2 Although the paper is not intended to deal with language policy, the fact remains that language 
is indeed a major issue in so far as the two corpora are concerned. At an EU level, the language 
of proceedings is by rule the one used in the application, whereas judges conventionally 
deliberate in French as a common language (cf. Berteloot 1999 and 
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/ Jo2_7024/>). This implies that in most cases, the English 
version of judgments is actually a translation from another language. This increases the interest 
in a variety of English, as it were, employed in a supra-national context across different legal 
systems. However, it does not prejudice the reliability of the study as it was shown elsewhere 
that neither the surface of text nor the generic structure of judgments are affected by potentially 
differing source-languages from which the English version was derived (Mazzi 2007b). As for 
the Republic of Ireland, it seems equally interesting to note that Article 8 of the Irish Constitution 
defines Irish as 'the first official language of the country'. However, the Court's judgments are 
most often delivered in English, even if the SCI corpus also includes one judgment (Ó Murchú v. 
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Finally, we made sure that the two corpora were also quantitatively 
comparable: for the ECJ corpus, the carefully constructed search engine of the 
Court's website was used to retrieve the last 50 judgments delivered by the 
ECJ on agriculture and its related areas; in the case of the SCI, an equivalent 
advanced search based on the term agriculture was launched, with the effect 
of retrieving a total of 46 judgments. In an attempt to guarantee that the 
corpora reflect a comparable time span, the websites of the two courts were 
both accessed for the purpose of corpus design at the end of May 2012. In the 
context of EU law, however, where agriculture tends to be a hot and at times 
deeply controversial issue, the time span ultimately covered by the corpus 
turned out to be more restricted (22 December 2010 – 24 May 2012), because 
a large number of judgments is pronounced by the court on that topic; by 
contrast, since agriculture is less often an area on which the Supreme Court of 
Ireland is called upon to rule, the time span was predictably larger 
(23 February 2001 –  21 July 2011) for the SCI corpus. Overall, the average 
length of EU judgments was measured as 5,592.08 words, whereas that of 
Irish texts amounted to 7,668.54 tokens per text.  
From a methodological perspective, the study combined corpus and discourse 
tools (Hunston 2002; Ädel & Reppen 2008; Swales 2009; Gabrielatos et al. 
2012) for the purpose of a qualitative and a quantitative investigation of 
markers of authorial qualification. This implied, first of all, retrieving the top 
twenty items used for this purpose within each corpus. A wordlist was thus 
generated for both ECJ and SCI judgments by means of the linguistic software 
package WordSmith Tools 5.0 (Scott 2009), with the aim of extracting the most 
frequent hedges and boosters from the first 200 tokens of each corpus. At the 
same time, Hyland's (1998) extensive list of hedges and boosters was kept as 
a reference to identify further elements across the two corpora, because the 
upper end of the wordlist of either corpus displayed fewer than the intended 
20 items.  
Secondly, a concordance-based study (Sinclair 2003, 2004) of the selected 
items was carried out. Concordancing is an insightful on-screen function of 
linguistic softwares, which enables the analyst to automatically collect all the 
occurrences of a word or phrase in context. As far as this paper is concerned, 
concordance lines were used as a basis to identify, at the outset, any recurrent 
(by definition, exceeding a minimum threshold of 10 entries) collocational and 
phraseological patterns of the selected hedges and boosters. 'Phraseology' is 
used here as a general term to account for the tendency of words to come 
together and make meaning by virtue of their combination (Sinclair 2004). 
Therefore, 'phraseology' is intended as an umbrella term that refers to an 
extensive range of items which have often been taken as a starting point to 
                                                                                                                                                        
An Taoiseach & chuid eile) delivered in Irish and only subsequently translated into English (cf. 
Article 8.3 of the Constitution).  
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describe the communicative practices of specialised communities by means of 
the recurrence of co-occurring items in medium to large-size corpora (Biber et 
al. 1999; Hunston 2008; Groom 2010). What is argued here is that 
phraseology may stand as a suitable candidate for the identification of a 
number of distinctive aspects and a set of recurrent structures of judicial 
argumentation.  
From a practical point of view, the concordance-based study amounted to 
detecting collocates – i.e. the words our items co-occur with on a regular basis 
– as well as focusing on 3/6-grams of each element – so that, for instance, the 
outstandingly frequent chunk it must be pointed out that was examined instead 
of the simple must.  
Finally, the use of the phraseological patterns of hedges and boosters in 
context was associated with the major interpretive and argumentative 
functions they were observed to perform in the two courts' argument. As 
Section 3 will show, the use of hedges and boosters was identified as being 
correlated with six main functions, the vast majority of which appears to be 
evenly distributed across the two corpora. These include, first of all, the courts' 
outline of the main premises of their line of argument; secondly, the care taken 
by judges to spell out the court's interpretation as explicitly as possible within 
controversial disputes; thirdly, the emphasis on a number of common 
reasoning techniques; fourthly, the effort to respond to competing arguments 
raised by the parties; in fifth place, the deployment of pragmatic 
argumentation; and finally, the stress on key judicial requirements in the 
current case or gaps in available legislation. 
3. Results 
3.1 Preliminary overview  
By implementing the methods outlined in Section 2, the most frequent hedges 
and boosters were retrieved for each corpus. The items are listed in Table 1 
below with the related frequency (raw and per 1,000 words): 
Item (ECJ) Raw 
frequency 
Per-1,000-
word 
frequency 
Item (SCI) Raw 
frequency 
Per-1,000-
word 
frequency 
must 870 3.11 would 1140 3.23 
establish 431 1.54 may  796 2.26 
should  392 1.41 should 628 1.78 
necessary 258 0.92 could 546 1.55 
interpret 244 0.87 must 422 1.19 
would  176 0.63 can  300 0.85 
Cannot 174 0.62 necessary 281 0.79 
Can 174 0.62 might 203 0.57 
apparent 116 0.42 cannot 153 0.43 
essentially 54 0.19 clearly 129 0.36 
actually 53 0.18 very 116 0.33 
Davide MAZZI 57 
manifestly 35 0.13 seems 111 0.32 
wrongly 21 0.07 indeed 61 0.17 
precisely 19 0.06 necessarily 57 0.16 
partially 18 0.06 no doubt  45 0.13 
necessarily 17 0.06 generally 44 0.13 
generally 16 0.05 actually 38 0.11 
formally  12 0.04 undoubtedly 28 0.08 
admittedly 10 0.04 perhaps 25 0.07 
approximately 9 0.03 essentially 22 0.06 
Table 1. Most frequent hedges and boosters (ECJ Corpus and SCI Corpus)  
The concordance-based analysis of the items reported in Table 1 led to detect 
their most recurrent collocational patterns. In turn, these were the basis for the 
identification of repetitive phraseology. Although these 3/6-grams are 
examined in the next section, their raw and per-1000-word frequency is 
outlined in Table 2:   
Phraseology 
(ECJ) 
Raw 
frequency 
Per-1,000-
word 
frequency 
Phraseology 
(SCI) 
Raw 
frequency 
Per-1,000-
word 
frequency 
must be 
interpreted 
as meaning 
that 
90 0.32 it would be 66 0.18 
it is 
necessary to 
38 0.14 it may be 38 0.11 
it must be 
held that  
28 0.10 it must be 37 0.11 
it must be 
pointed out 
that 
19 0.06 necessary for 
the 
29 0.08 
it would be 10 0.04 
Table 2. Most frequent phraseology (ECJ Corpus and SCI Corpus)  
In the attempt to describe the textual and argumentative uses of hedges and 
boosters in each corpus, collocational and phraseological patterns were 
studied in context: as a result, six main functions were retrieved. These were 
anticipated in Section 2 and are reviewed in 3.2 below. 
3.2 Attitudinal qualification in context: the functions of hedges and 
boosters 
The first function with which attitudinal qualification may be correlated is the 
courts' willingness to outline the main premises of their own reasoning. This 
amounts to emphasising the cardinal principles behind each court's argument, 
and it is reserved for the boosters it must be held that and it must be in EU 
and Irish judgments respectively. In all of its 28 occurrences, it must be held 
that introduces the overriding principle on which the court's argumentation will 
rest in the remainder of the text: in (1), accordingly, the decision to declare 
Article 44a of Regulation 1290/2005 and Regulation 259/2008 invalid is not 
simply based on the fact that they impose an obligation to publish personal 
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data. Rather, it follows from the straightforward implementation of the 
fundamental rule of fair balance between respective interests duly underlying 
any provision of EU law:3 
(1) In those circumstances, it must be held that the provisions of European Union law, the 
validity of which is questioned by the referring court, observe, in so far as they concern 
the publication of data relating to legal persons, a fair balance in the consideration taken 
of the respective interests in issue. On the basis of all of the foregoing, Article 44a of 
Regulation No 1290/2005 and Regulation No 259/2008 must be declared invalid to the 
extent to which, with regard to natural persons who are beneficiaries of EAGF and 
EAFRD aid, those provisions impose an obligation to publish personal data relating to 
each beneficiary without drawing a distinction based on relevant criteria such as the 
periods during which those persons have received such aid, the frequency of such aid or 
the nature and amount thereof. (ECJ, Heifert v. Land Essen) 
In a similar vein, it must be is used to formulate a principle of Irish legal 
decision-making in 43.3% of its SCI Corpus entries. In particular, the cluster 
colligates with the verbs remember, recall, bear in mind, assume, presume, 
emphasise and appreciate whose semantic preference is that of stating the 
starting point of the court's appraisal of facts in cases such as (2). Here, the 
Supreme Court of Justice was requested to assess the proper implementation 
of EU norms into the national legislative framework. In order to determine 
whether an act of the Oireachtas – i.e. the Irish Parliament – does more than 
merely transposing EU law into the domestic legal framework, the argument 
goes, the premise to be borne in mind is that the relevant principles should be 
derived less from the implementing act itself than from the Directive or 
Regulation the Act is designed to implement: 
(2) However, in applying that test to a case in which the regulation is made in purported 
exercise of the powers of the Minister under s. 3 of the 1972 Act, it must be borne in 
mind that, while the parent statute is the 1972 Act, the relevant principles and policies 
cannot be derived from that Act, having regard to the very general terms in which it is 
couched. In each case, it is necessary to look to the Directive or Regulation and, it may 
be, the treaties in order to reach a conclusion as to whether the statutory instrument does 
no more than fill in the details of principles and policies contained in the EC or EU 
legislation. (SCI, Maher et al. v. Minister for Agriculture) 
The second function documented by the corpus data is that of boosters 
spelling out the courts' interpretation in hard cases where the difficulty lies in 
decoding controversial legal terms or norms. In EU texts, this function is 
overwhelmingly associated with the phraseology must be interpreted as 
meaning that: the highly formulaic nature of the cluster is such that all of its 90 
occurrences are devoted to the settlement of disputes by way of an 
authoritative clarification of the meaning of controversial passages in 
legislation. In (3), for instance, the Court proceeds to pronouncing judgment by 
defining the putatively correct interpretation of Subheading 0207 of the first 
annex to a regulation on the proper quantification of poultry tariffs: 
                                                 
3  In all numbered examples, the words/phrases under investigation are underlined, whereas any 
salient collocate is in bold typeface. Moreover, the case each example is taken from is reported 
in brackets at the end of each passage. 
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(3) Subheading 0207 12 90 of Annex I to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3846/87 of 17 
December 1987 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a poultry carcass under that 
subheading has to be completely drawn, so that it is prejudicial to its tariff classification if 
part of the guts or trachea, for example, are still attached to the carcass following a 
mechanical gutting process. (ECJ, Stolle v. Haupzollamt-Hamburg) 
In Irish judgments, the function is again served by a booster, i.e. clearly. The 
adverbial is used by judges for the purpose of stressing what they see as the 
preferred interpretation of the law: more specifically, 35.3% of its occurrences 
signal that the Court is disambiguating controversial terminology by referring to 
its settled case law. In (4), the meaning of the disputed phrase power of 
adjudication is explained by the Court, which stresses the consistency 
between the proposed interpretation in the current case and that expressed in 
Haughey v. Moriarty: 
(4) The court then went on to consider the question as to whether what they described again 
as 'this power of adjudication' can be considered to be one normally and necessarily 
exercised by a legislature in a democratic state. The use of the latter phrase is clearly a 
reference to its use in the judgment of this court in Haughey v. Moriarty, where the court 
said: […] (SCI, Ardagh et al. v. Maguire et al.) 
From a more inherently argumentative perspective, it is remarkable that three 
of the functions identified in the data appear to be closely linked with a number 
of reasoning techniques to be retrieved in both corpora. The first of these 
corresponds to a use of boosters that highlights some of the Courts' well-
established reasoning processes, as it were: in the case of EU judgments, it is 
apparent that judges are keen on procedural aspects – e.g. case law-oriented 
practices – they deliberately stress as being the secure foundations for their 
verdict in the case at hand. This can be pointed out with regard to 21.1% of it 
is necessary to, invariably embedded in the larger pattern [it is necessary to + 
analyze/consider + the/its + wording/scope], as in (5). In order to dispel any 
doubt about the suitable interpretation of the expression prevents an on-the-
spot check from being carried out, whose transposition into the various EU 
languages has been markedly heterogeneous, the Court recalls the standard 
procedure of looking at the context, as well as the scheme of the related 
regulation: 
(5) In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court's settled case-law, 
in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its 
wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part 
[…]. It must be observed, first of all, that the actual wording of Article 23(2) of Regulation 
No 796/2004 does not contain any indication as regards the meaning to give to the 
expression 'prevents an on-the-spot check [from being carried out]'. […] In view of the 
linguistic differences, the purport of the concept of European Union law in question 
cannot be determined on the basis of an exclusively textual interpretation. That 
expression must therefore be interpreted in the light of the context in which it is used and 
of the aims and scheme of the regulation of which it is part […]. (ECJ, Omejc v. Republika 
Slovenija)     
In SCI judicial opinions, the use of boosters in the same respects tends to 
underlie the Court's deployment of "argument from legislative intentions" 
(Summers 1991; Mazzi 2014a), whereby the judges' decision ultimately rests 
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on their purported knowledge of the legislators' intentions at the moment when 
the rule in question came into force. This is the case with both 5.4% of the 
occurrences of clearly and 40% of those of no doubt. The former significantly 
collocates with items sharing a distinctive semantic preference of 'volition', e.g. 
envisage, intend, it be (not) the intention and unwilling: in (6), thus, Justice 
Keane justifies his standpoint that Ministers are prevented from including a 
provision for the creation of an indictable offence in a statutory norm, on the 
grounds that this was the actual resolve of the Oireachtas as it passed the 
relevant legislation. In (7), likewise, the thesis is that only under special 
circumstances can members of the public be denied the right to access 
information retained by public bodies. In an equally emphatic way, the remark 
is supported by the view that this precisely corresponds to the legislature's 
willingness: 
(6) While a Minister in his particular area of responsibility was undoubtedly entitled to give 
effect to principles and policies which had never been enacted by the Oireachtas but 
were contained in an EC measure, that could only be done by invoking the powers 
conferred on ministers by S.3 of the 1972 Act. Where a Minister availed of those powers, 
as he could have done in this case, he was precluded from including in the instrument a 
provision for the creation of an indictable offence. That was clearly intended by the 
Oireachtas as an important limitation on the power of ministers to give effect by delegated 
legislation to EC measures and they could not have envisaged that a Minister would 
circumvent that prohibition by purporting to make the order under other legislation which 
contained no indication that it was intended to be used for the purpose of giving effect to 
EC measures. (SCI, Browne v. Attorney General) 
 
(7) As was emphasised by O'Donovan J in the Minister for Agriculture and Food v. The 
Information Commissioner (2000) 1 I.R. 309 at 319, in the light of its preamble, it seems 
to me that there can be no doubt but that it was the intention of the legislature when 
enacting the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, 1997, that it was only in 
exceptional cases that members of the public at large should be deprived of access to 
information in the possession of public bodies and this intention is exemplified by the 
provision of s. 34 (12)(b) of the Act which provides that a decision to refuse to grant 
access to information sought shall be presumed not to have been justified until the 
contrary is shown. (SCI, Sheedy v. Information Commissioner) 
Predictably, the line of reasoning of both ECJ and SCI also implies responding 
to competing arguments raised by one of the parties. This best characterises 
the next function of attitudinal qualification across the two corpora. To begin 
with, the selected items may mark the onset of the Court's own counterclaims, 
as with it must be pointed out that in ECJ judgments. In 26.3% of its 
occurrences, the booster collocates with dialogic formulations in which the 
opposing argument by one of the parties can be readily perceived, e.g. unlike 
what * pointed out or although it is true that. In (8), therefore, the Court's 
statement that the main objective of Regulation 1/2005 is to protect animals 
during transport ought to be read as a counter-argumentation to the disputed 
(if credible) allegation that the regulation envisages the elimination of technical 
barriers to trade along with a smooth operation of market organisations: 
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(8) As regards the objectives of Regulation No 1/2005, it must be pointed out that, although 
it is true that the elimination of technical barriers to trade in live animals and the smooth 
operation of market organisations, referred to in recital 2 in the preamble to that 
regulation, form part of the purpose of that regulation in the same way as they formed 
part of that of Directive 91/628, of which Regulation No 1/2005 constitutes the extension, 
it is, however, apparent from recitals 2, 6 and 11 in the preamble to that regulation that, 
like that directive, its main objective is the protection of animals during transport. (ECJ, 
Danske Svineproducenter v. Justitsministeriet) 
In the SCI corpus, the response to competing arguments often takes the form 
of passages where the Court offers varying degrees of concession to the 
arguments it seeks to reverse. As a result, whereas the booster in (8) 
emphasizes the Court's own standpoint, the two elements observed in the Irish 
texts qualify the opposing argument, either in more tentative terms (cf. 23.7% 
of the corpus entries for it may be) or with a more assertive tone (32.2% of 
undoubtedly). In (9), accordingly, Justice Fennelly argues that the point made 
by the Minister for Agriculture – notably that the presence of bone spicules, a 
processed animal protein the marketing of which is forbidden by EU law, 
justified the action of impounding a cargo – was not to be discarded as 
completely irrelevant, but rather as a minor one compared to the main issue of 
proceedings. And in (10), the actual merit in the argument that the milk quota 
scheme has to be defined at an EU level is challenged by the Court, whose 
ruling is that implementation plans are left to Member States to determine, 
instead: 
(9) On the other hand, the Minister says that the second issue has potential future relevance. 
It may be important in other cases to know whether the presence of bone spicules, 
without direct evidence of processed animal proteins, will justify the sort of actions taken. 
Nonetheless, it seems to me that it is necessary to address the second question only if a 
positive answer is given to the first. If the Minister had no power, under the 2000 
Regulation, to issue recall instructions or search and seizure notices, it does not matter 
whether the product was allegedly contaminated with processed animal protein or merely 
with other irrelevant and harmless foreign matter. If she had not the power, she could not 
do it. (SCI, Minister for Agriculture et al. v. Albatros Feeds Ltd.) 
 
(10) It is undoubtedly the case that the milk quota/super levy scheme is intended to be tightly 
regulated by the EC institutions and that the manner in which it operates in all the 
member States is regularly monitored by the Commission. However, that does not alter 
the fact that, in specific areas, the EC has decided that the manner in which it is to be 
implemented in the member States is to be left to the member States to determine. (SCI, 
Maher et al. v. Minister for Agriculture) 
The construction of the Court's own argument equally serves as the context for 
a specific function of hedges, namely the deployment of pragmatic 
argumentation (Carbonell 2013; Mazzi 2014b). This is an inherently 
consequentialist argument form, whereby "judges often defend a decision by 
referring to the consequences of application of a particular legal rule in the 
concrete case" (Feteris 2002: 349). Of the many variants of pragmatic 
argumentation discussed so far in the literature, "Variant II" (Van Poppel 2012) 
appears to be frequent in the two corpora under investigation: the Court holds 
that a decision should not be reached on the grounds that it would bring about 
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undesirable effects. This variant of pragmatic argumentation is correlated to 
the 3-gram it would be in 60% of its ECJ occurrences, and 57.6% of its SCI 
entries. The correlation between the cluster and Variant II of pragmatic 
argumentation is significant in both EU and Irish judgments, and it becomes 
particularly evident in the former due to its strong colligational ties with 
negatively evaluative adjectives denoting the downsides of the decision 
dispreferred by the Court, e.g. excessive, inconsistent with and manifestly 
contrary to: 
(11) Like the farmers who have applied for livestock aid, farmers who have applied for aid 
under Article 22 of Regulation No 1257/1999 […] and who fail to comply with the rules on 
the identification and registration of bovine animals run the risk of the same legal 
consequences […]. In those circumstances, it would be inconsistent with the principle of 
equal treatment if the situation of farmers who applied for aid under Article 22 of 
Regulation No 1257/1999, which is subject to a condition relating to density of livestock, 
were treated differently from the situation of farmers who applied for livestock aid, with 
only the latter having the right to be informed by the national authorities that any animals 
found not to be correctly identified or registered in the system for the identification and 
registration for bovine animals are to count as animals found with irregularities liable to 
have legal consequences, such as a reduction in or exclusion from the aid concerned. 
Furthermore, that difference in treatment could not be objectively justified. (ECJ, Nagy v. 
Mezgazdasági) 
 
(12) I am satisfied that it would be a step too far to infer such a power in an Act which did not 
expressly provide for such a power. Further, I am satisfied that to make such an inference 
would be to legislate – a matter for the Oireachtas, not a court of law. Indeed, it would be 
an unconstitutional construction of the Act of 1993. (SCI, Quinn v. Attorney general et al.) 
What is common to both passages is the Courts' use of a hedge to expatiate 
on the undesirable consequences of a decision they will eventually reject as 
unacceptable. In (12), Justice Denham warns that allowing for the special 
power advocated by the one of the defendants – i.e. the Minister for 
Agriculture – on a regular basis, would not simply force the Supreme Court to 
legislate, but more generally lead to the adverse effect of an unconstitutional 
construction of an Act of the Oireachtas. In (11), similarly, the ECJ is 
requested to establish whether farmers applying for livestock aid and those 
applying for aid under Regulation No 1275/1999 are to be treated differently 
for any reason. Accordingly, it offers an insightful reading based on the cogent 
nature of the principle of equal treatment, which underlies an instance of 
pragmatic argumentation best schematised in Table 3 below: 
Variant II ECJ text 
1. Action X should not 
be performed 
 
1. Action X (i.e. ruling that farmers who have applied for livestock aid and 
farmers who have applied for aid under Article 22 of Regulation No 
1257/1999 should be treated differently) should not be performed. 
1.1a Action X leads to Y 
1.1b. Y is undesirable 1.1b. Y is undesirable (it would be inconsistent with the principle of equal 
treatment) 
1.1a-1.1b' (If action X leads to Y and Y is undesirable, then action X should not be performed) 
Table 3. Variant II of pragmatic argumentation in Nagy v. Mezgazdasági 
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Finally, a peculiarity of Irish judgements lies in the use of boosters to either 
draw attention to judicial requirements that the Supreme Court deems 
fundamental in the current case, or highlight gaps in the legislation in force at 
the time the case is tried. The former applies to 24.2% of the attested 
occurrences of the whole pattern [necessary for the x to do y] instantiated in 
(13), where Justice Fennelly recalls that defendants in the main dispute are 
demanded to demonstrate that plaintiffs are guilty of inordinate and 
inexcusable delay whenever the burden of proof falls upon them. Moving on to 
the SCI's intention to identify conspicuous lacks in legislation, this is often 
expressed by means of indeed: in 9.8% of its attested uses, this item leads the 
judge to point out the areas that current norms hardly ever cover in a 
satisfactory manner (cf. 14 below): 
(13) The governing consideration is that first stated by Hamilton C.J., namely that "the courts 
have an inherent jurisdiction to control their own procedure and to dismiss a claim when 
the interests of justice require them to do so". It is always necessary for the defendant 
applicant to demonstrate, and he bears that burden, that the plaintiff has been guilty of 
inordinate and inexcusable delay. Subject to that, however, the court should aim at a 
global appreciation of the interests of justice and should balance all the considerations as 
they emerge from the conduct of and the interests of all the parties to the litigation. (SCI, 
Anglo-Irish Beef Processors Ltd. et al. v. Montgomery et al.) 
 
(14) I can well understand how infelicities and omissions in the Instrument led Murphy J. to 
observe of Rule 7(2) that "This may prove to be a difficult provision to construe as to 
when the information must be given to the superior officer". Indeed, the Instrument is 
completely silent on that important topic. (SCI, Curley v. Arbour Hill) 
4. Discussion 
The findings presented in Section 3 show that boosters tend to outnumber 
hedges across the two corpora, even though the two items ranked first in the 
SCI wordlist (would and may) would normally be classified as hedges. This 
study has been less concerned with a separate investigation of hedging and 
boosting than with the overall identification of important aspects of attitudinal 
qualification in two comparable data sets from the same genre. In the main, 
hedges and boosters can be seen to have an important function as markers of 
judicial discourse across the two courts.  
Most importantly, they operate at the intersection of three inter-related 
dimensions of judicial argumentative discourse in both corpora, i.e. a sense of 
putative objectivity, authoritativeness, and the search for cogent and 
convincing arguments. As regards the courts' purportedly objective tone, first 
of all, the use of hedges in examples such as (12) may be read in line with 
Vass's (2004: 134) view that this type of attitudinal qualification creates "an 
impression of objectivity and prevent[s] future conflict, especially regarding 
future applications of the decision". Accordingly, the choice of hedging and the 
simultaneous deployment of pragmatic argumentation may serve a two-fold 
purpose. The former enables the court to pass judgment without imposing its 
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will over the parties' argument or sounding too straightforward. At the same 
time, the use of pragmatic argumentation raises the profile of the court's 
reasoning in that it does not appear as symptomatic of the court's attempt to 
prevail over opposing arguments as it is of worries about the undesirable 
effects a different decision would produce in the long term. 
From the viewpoint of the courts' authoritativeness, secondly, the occurrences 
of hedges and boosters in the contexts best described in examples (8)-(10) 
project a highly favourable image for both courts, i.e. that of adjudicating 
institutions which pronounce a verdict only after carefully balancing the needs 
and arguments put forward by the parties in the dispute. As we could see, 
there is a distinctively dialogic character in the observed use of it must be 
pointed out that, it may be and undoubtedly. This is indicative of the trend to 
warrant serious consideration for any major aspect covered in the parties' line 
of reasoning, whether in the form of broader allegations (cf. 8) or more 
explicitly formulated arguments (9 and 10 alike). Likewise, the courts' recourse 
to argument from legislative intentions – as for clearly and no doubt in (6)-(7) – 
may lend itself to interpretation on two levels: the first of these is a great boost 
to the SCI's own credentials, because knowledge of the Oireachtas's 
intentions could imply the Court's rigorous scrutiny of any preparatory 
document informing the parliamentary debate and eventually leading to the 
law's enforcement (cf. Summers 1991). The second level at which argument 
from legislative intentions might be read has something to do with the Court's 
emphasis on the ultimate willingness of the Oireachtas. This might be closely 
linked with the search for convincing support for its own standpoint, in so far as 
this is argued to coincide with the scheme with which the law was passed. 
Indeed, it might be argued that the Court is striving to reinforce its own 
argument, while at the same time shifting the responsibility for a potentially 
controversial decision to another, highly influential subject, such as the 
Oireachtas itself. This is an example of how hedges and boosters are relevant 
as discursive resources for signalling the courts' quest for cogent arguments. 
This becomes equally evident in the choice of the hedge it may be in (9) as 
well as in the preference for pragmatic argumentation in (11)-(12). Not only 
does it may be soften the illocutionary force of an opposing argument to 
ultimately "reinforce the justice's line of argumentation" (Vass 2004: 134), but 
there is also a high degree of strategic maneuvering behind pragmatic 
argumentation, as documented in Section 3.  
The notion of 'strategic maneuvering' was introduced by pragma-dialectic 
scholars of argumentation to refer to "the continual efforts made in all moves 
that are carried out in argumentative discourse to keep the balance between 
reasonableness and effectiveness" (Van Eemeren 2010: 40). The 
simultaneous pursuit of both aims is a distinctive trait of pragmatic 
argumentation: it is as reasonable to contend in (11) that the importance of the 
principle of equal treatment prevents the ECJ from reaching decisions that 
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would undermine its uniform and ubiquitous application, as it is a valid concern 
for the SCI to make sure that no Acts of the Oireachtas are constitutionally 
misconstrued. Nevertheless, these arguments also serve as powerful 
rhetorical weapons for both courts to have the upper hand in the resolution of 
serious disputes.  
On a final note, it is not only noteworthy that hedges and boosters were 
reported to be closely connected with the onset of recurrent argumentative 
patterns across the two courts, with special reference to argument from 
legislative intentions and pragmatic argumentation. It is equally interesting that 
corpus data suggest the presence of context-specific differences between the 
two courts worth further investigation in future research. As documented 
elsewhere (Mazzi 2014a), on the one hand, the ECJ rather impersonally 
proceeds to the quest for legal truth, as it were, by laying strong, unmediated 
emphasis on a preferred interpretation arising from a set of influential sources 
including (but not limited to) the Court's settled case law. On the other hand, 
the findings presented here are indicative of SCI's proclivity to negotiate its 
adjudicating role in terms of a cline between assertive and cautious 
approaches to the interpretation of controversial legislation. SCI Justices 
therefore do more than just reiterate the importance of key interpretative 
requirements in the judicial process, in that they sometimes even take a critical 
stance with respect to the gaps of the legislation they are supposed to 
elucidate and enforce. This sheds light on an essential dimension of hedges 
and boosters that invites further corpus-based comparative investigations, i.e. 
the capability of such forms of attitudinal qualification to reflect clear 
interactional and institutional understandings of judges as socially situated 
writers (Hyland 1998) operating within their respective legal system and 
culture.  
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